DAO governance: Why voting doesn't work

Rodrigo Silva · 01.05.2025, 13:42:23

DAO governance: Why voting doesn't work


Author: Rodrigo Silva | Governance Researcher | Delegate at Uniswap, Arbitrum, and Optimism

I've voted on over 300 DAO proposals in the past two years. I've written governance frameworks, debated tokenomics, watched millions move based on snapshot votes. Here's my confession: most of it is theater. The emperor has no clothes, and we keep pretending otherwise.

The participation crisis

Let's start with the obvious. Nobody votes.

Average voter turnout in major DAOs hovers around 3-5% of token supply. Uniswap, one of the most important protocols in DeFi, regularly passes proposals with under 4% participation. Compound governance has seen proposals pass with barely 1% of tokens voting.

We've built decentralized governance systems that are governed by a tiny minority. The rhetoric says "community-owned." The reality is closer to "whoever shows up."

Why don't people vote? Rational apathy. For most token holders, the cost of researching proposals exceeds any benefit from participating. Your vote probably won't be decisive. Your time has better uses. So you don't vote, and neither does anyone else, and suddenly $10 billion protocols are steered by whoever has the stamina to care.

Plutocracy with extra steps

Even when people vote, token-weighted governance is just plutocracy. One token, one vote means whales dominate. Always.

Look at any major DAO. The top 10 addresses typically control 50-80% of voting power. These aren't random community members — they're venture funds, founding teams, and large investors. The same people who'd control a traditional company, now with blockchain aesthetics.

I've sat in governance calls where everyone knows the outcome before voting starts. The whales have decided. The discussion is performance. We go through motions of decentralized decision-making while actual power concentrates exactly as it always has.

Delegation doesn't fix this — it just adds a layer. Delegates accumulate power from passive holders. The largest Uniswap delegates control more voting power than most whale wallets. We've recreated representative democracy, except the representatives are unelected and unaccountable.

The speed problem

Decentralized governance is slow. Painfully, dangerously slow.

Standard proposal cycles take 1-2 weeks minimum. Discussion phase. Temperature check. Formal vote. Timelock. Execution. While you're debating, markets move, exploits happen, opportunities vanish.

In August 2023, Curve Finance was exploited for $60 million. The protocol needed immediate action. DAO governance couldn't respond fast enough. Emergency multisigs had to intervene — the same centralized structures DAOs were supposed to replace.

Every major DAO maintains backdoors for emergencies. Security councils. Guardian multisigs. Admin keys. We acknowledge through architecture what we deny through marketing: pure decentralized governance can't handle real-world speed requirements.

Information asymmetry everywhere

To vote intelligently, you need to understand complex technical and economic tradeoffs. Most token holders can't — not because they're stupid, but because they have jobs and lives.

Proposal quality varies wildly. Some are well-researched with clear impact analysis. Others are barely coherent forum posts requesting millions in treasury funds. Distinguishing between them requires expertise most voters don't have.

Core teams have massive information advantages. They know the codebase, the roadmap, the undisclosed partnerships. When they advocate for proposals, they're not just another voice — they're the only voice with complete context. "Decentralized governance" often means "team proposes, community rubber-stamps."

What actually works (somewhat)

I'm critical, but not hopeless. Some mechanisms show promise.

Conviction voting — where voting power increases the longer you commit — rewards long-term alignment over last-minute whale interventions. Gitcoin uses this. It's not perfect, but it changes dynamics meaningfully.

Quadratic voting reduces plutocracy by making additional votes progressively more expensive. If 1 vote costs 1 token, 2 votes cost 4, 3 votes cost 9. Whales can still dominate, but the curve is less steep. Gitcoin Grants used this for funding allocation with reasonable results.

Optimistic governance — where proposals pass unless explicitly vetoed — flips the default. Instead of requiring active approval, you only need absence of strong objection. Reduces voter fatigue, speeds decisions, maintains safety rails.

Specialized councils with narrow mandates — risk committees, grants committees, technical review boards — acknowledge that not every decision needs full community vote. Delegate specific powers to accountable groups. It's less "pure" but more functional.

The uncomfortable truth

Most successful protocols are effectively governed by small groups pretending to be governed by communities. And maybe that's fine?

Ethereum isn't a DAO, but it works. Bitcoin has no formal governance, but it evolves. The most important decisions often happen through rough consensus and informal coordination, not token votes.

Perhaps the goal shouldn't be "decentralize everything" but "centralize accountably." Small, identifiable groups with clear responsibilities and removal mechanisms. Transparency about who makes decisions and why. Community veto power for truly egregious actions.

Less utopian than "pure decentralization." More honest about how organizations actually work.

Where we go from here

I'll keep voting. I'll keep delegating. But I've stopped pretending we've solved governance. We've built experiments, some interesting, none conclusive.

The next generation of governance will probably look less like democracy and more like specialized bureaucracy — expert councils, limited mandates, clear escalation paths. Boring compared to "the community decides." But boring sometimes works.

The question isn't whether token voting is decentralized. It's whether it produces good outcomes. By that measure, the jury is very much still out.

Rodrigo Silva researches governance mechanisms across major DeFi protocols. He serves as delegate for Uniswap, Arbitrum, and Optimism with combined voting power exceeding $50 million in delegated tokens.

#Crypto


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